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
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K-ARGENTINA: Diplomatic Foot-Drago	ing
The Thatcher government yesterday reionegotiate but asserted that the next movel though the Argentine Government rejected lan, it said it was open to some other app	e was up to Buenos Aires. Secreta <u>ry of State Haia's</u>
//Prime Minister Thatcher yested arliament that military moves were iplomatic efforts and described the semeasured and controlled." She adagestion that the dispute be refersional Court of Justice, noting that in a has refused to recognize the contact addition, she expressed her continued that it are arrested to the US that it are associated to the US that it ar	taken to back up military response lso rejected the red to the Interna- in the past Argen- urt's jurisdiction. nuing confidence in ncy reported that s latest proposals
or resolving the crisis are unsatisurther clarification.	
	he government's con- the sovereignty issue. n in negotiations is ntended to place
//Argentina's answer reflects to iction that it cannot back down on the Argentines' willingness to remain continuation of stalling tactics is ondon in an embarrassing diplomatic	he government's con- the sovereignty issue. n in negotiations is ntended to place
//Argentina's answer reflects to a continuation of stalling tactics in an embarrassing diplomatic	he government's con- the sovereignty issue. n in negotiations is ntended to place position if a British



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CHAD: Mounting Tensions	
Factional tensions are increasing i peacekeeping troops begin to leave Chad a to purge his cabinet in hopes of strength	nd President Goukoun <u>i plans</u>
Goukouni reportedly intends to coalition government in the next for faction, which leans toward negotion be ousted, and the regime would be sive," pro-Libyan cast in order to military assistance by Tripoli.	ew days. The southern ating with Habre, would given a more "progres-
Comment: Although the impend offered by Lagos as the reason for posed battalion, the Nigerians bel will bring pressure on Goukouni to They also may hope that Goukouni i flexible leader.	withdrawing its ex- ieve the withdrawal negotiate with Habre.
If Goukouni goes through with it could backfire and cause more con N'Djamena. As fears mount of a of the capital by Habre, Western retargets of harassment.	onfusion and division possible occupation
it could backfire and cause more contint N'Djamena. As fears mount of a of the capital by Habre, Western re	onfusion and division possible occupation

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IRAN-IRAQ: Iranian Attack Imminent	
The new offensive Iran has been preparing launched within the next few days.	g probably will be
Baghdad alleged ye Air Force bombed <u>Iran's major oil ex</u> por	t terminal at
Khark Island.//	
Mha Tuaniana and 12	
The Iranians probably will try to roads at Seyyed Abud and then advance o	n the Ahvaz-
Chorramshahr road. Unless the Iraqis me forces into the area they are likely to	ove additional
defeat.	surrer another
Iraq's claim to have bombed Khark	Island is uncon-
firmed. Even ineffective airstrikes, h	owever, could
liscourage incoming tankers. Iran is c ing at least 1.5 million barrels per da	y of oil.

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INTERNATIONAL: UN Session on Disarmamen	ıt
//Radical members of the committee prepari session on disarmament to be held at the UN in S demand that language be included in the final do sion accusing the US and the USSR of lack of int	Tune probably will ocument of the ses-
//The 78-nation committee began mee on Monday. Its main purpose during the is to discuss some of the substantive is recently in Geneva by the Committee on D of the most controversial of these issue draft comprehensive program on disarmame	next two weeks sues reviewed isarmament. One s is a complex
//The Western nations successfully less realistic proposals in Geneva. The however, will have greater representation	radical states,
Comment: //Efforts to achieve a mo will have little appeal for many of the Brazil, Sweden, Sri Lanka, and others, h about achieving arms control progress in channels, and they may be willing to wor	nonaligned nations. owever, are serious multilateral

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JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Aid Discussions	
Tokyo and Seoul are entering a new stage in negotiations on South Korea's request for \$6 bill ment plans for 1982-86.	the drawn out ion for its develop-
Prime Minister Suzuki has set the to aid Japan is prepared to offer at \$4 bill was conveyed to Seoul yesterday in the ho direct intervention would convince Presid the \$4 billion package is Japan's best of	ion. The offer pe that Suzuki's ent Chun that
Comment: The official development a ably will not exceed \$1.5 billion in concabout \$300 million a year compared with \$ committed in 1980. Export-Import Bank loup the rest.	essional loans 200 million
//There is some risk that either Tok overreact, inject greater tension into th and delay resolution of the aid issue. B cussed this issue with Washington in the to engage the US again if an impasse deve	e relationship, oth have dis- past and may seek

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POLAND: Tests of Regime Control The May Day festivities planned causing concern among the authoritie activists will disrupt the official	s, who fear So <u>lidarity</u>
are expected to converge on Czestoche this weekend for the start of a month bration of the country's patron sain. Comment: The large crowds gathe of the country will offer Solidarity ties for some protest actions. The maintain tight control to ensure that not get out of hand. The Church alse efforts to prevent its celebrations political springboard.	h-long religious cele- t. ered in many parts activists opportuni- regime, however, will t the proceedings do o will make special
IRAN: Succession Prospects The dominant hardline clerics at toward resolution of the succession credited Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, the clerical opponent. Ayatollah Khomein daily on Wednesday that Ayatollah Monsumed heir, "will undoubtedly have the of the revolution."	issue, having dis- heir leading moderate ni's son told a Tehran ntazeri, long the pre-
Comment: The statement by Khome strongest indication so far that Monthas received the approval of Khomeins clerics. Montazeri, however, lacks lauthority. Even if he were to be for succeed Khomeini, real power probably hands of President Khamenei, Assembly and activist clerics in Qom.	tazeri's succession i and other top Khomeini's dominant rmally selected to y would be in the

BELGIUM-USSR: COCOM Embargo Violation	
Belgium plans to export a COCOM-cont center to the USSR despite the embargo in technology equipment to the Soviets. Bruthat it would proceed with the sale if it COCOM approval by 20 April. Belgium with from COCOM and announced its intention to the sale, even though only Norway, France and Turkey had approved the sale by that	sales of high- ssels had warned did not receive drew the case proceed with west Germany,
Comment: The limited enthusiasm of for the embargo evidently has continued t beginnings in 1980. Belgium's action, ho first overt defiance of this COCOM embarg pating country. The Belgians probably ar sale to help the selling firm, which is i trouble.	o wane since its wever, is the oby a partici-e approving the

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS		
SOUTH AFRICA: Strategy for Racial Refor	m	25X1
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Prime Minister Botha will continue to have forward with racial reforms, despite the recent rightwing opponents from the National Party. The will propose constitutional amendments giving Co	ouster of several vis summer Botha Vloreds and Asians	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
limited representation in parliament, but the pr criticized by both conservative Afrikaners and C leaders. The debate over these reforms will fur African society and alienate urban blacks, whose political representation will not be addressed.	Colored and Asian ther polarize South	25 X 1
The Prime Minister believes that the Coloreds and Asians can become political country's 4.5 million whites. In additional representation in parliament Botha possito offer the two groups a role in the casteps to reduce white political control, be anathema to many rightwing Afrikaners	allies of the on to limited bly is prepared binet. Any such however, would	25X1
Concessions to Rightwingers		
Andries Treurnicht and other member Conservative Party have been drawing largublic rallies, and Botha will proceed s reform agenda while he tests white toler. He probably will first seek support for at the National Party's congress in July ing them to parliament.	ge crowds at lowly with his ance for change. his proposals	25X
Although Botha eventually will win party for a reform package, he may have concessions to prevent additional conservanty members from defecting to Treurnick cently suggested his willingness to complainted in a speech to parliament, that is eral years to phase Coloreds and Asians roles in the pational government.	to make several vative National ht. Botha re- romise, when he t may take sev-	25X
roles in the national government.		201
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Colored and Asian Response

Concessions to the conservative elements of the party will make it more difficult for the government to gain acceptance of its proposals from Coloreds and Asians, who have become increasingly radical in recent years. Influential spokesmen for the two groups are already unhappy with the government's unwillingness to discuss reform proposals directly with them. They believe that the Prime Minister is taking Colored and Asian acceptance for granted.

Even those Colored and Asian leaders who are willing to work with Botha have rejected the notion of separate parliaments for their two groups. Instead they demand representation with whites in a single legislature—a move opposed by many conservative Afrikaner politicians.

Many Coloreds and Asians identify with blacks, and their leaders also will demand that the government make some concessions on black issues in return for their acceptance of the new proposals. Botha, however, will point to the split in the National Party over the Colored and Asian issue as proof that he can go no further on the reform question without risking a white backlash.

Prospects

The proposals for the inclusion of Coloreds and Asians in parliament will be debated for some months, but this debate will largely ignore the key question of black political rights. White, Colored, and Asian moderates probably will reach some agreement eventually, but the most significant effect of the changes will be to polarize South African society further.

Whatever agreement is reached, radical Coloreds and Asians--mostly students, academics, and labor activists--will accuse their leaders of selling out. Treurnicht and other conservative Afrikaner politicians will attempt to attract public support for their parties by exaggerating the effects of Botha's policies.

The government may attempt to allay black demands by offering urban blacks greater autonomy over local affairs. Most blacks, however, will continue to work for some form of national political representation.

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